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 Chapter 9 
 Refl ection and Impulse as Determinants 
of Human Behavior 
 Anand  Krishna and  Fritz  Strack 
 The Missing Link Between Knowledge and Action 
 The experience of being and acting human is a universal theme of cultural expres-
sion. From movies to great literary works, great weight is placed on both of these 
aspects, being and acting. Literary fi gures that resonate in our minds do so both 
because of their heroic (or antiheroic) actions and their inner life—their motiva-
tions, feelings, and thoughts on their own existence and actions. Sometimes this 
inner life refl ects a clever, refl ective type of thinking, as with the Danaans in Homer’s 
 Iliad and their plan to defeat the Trojans by infi ltrating the city in a wooden horse. 
But equally fascinating are the stories of protagonists who show an impetuous, 
impulsive side, such as Icarus, the Greek youth who fl ew too close to the sun and 
thereby melted his artifi cial wings despite his father’s specifi c warning. Lastly, there 
are those fi gures who are faced with an inner confl ict between refl ection and 
impulse—Odysseus, for all his cleverness, cannot resist the temptation to hear the 
deadly song of the Sirens, yet his forethought in having himself tied to the mast of 
his ship defeats the impulse to drown himself trying to reach them. 
 These three Greek legends appear to show different ways of thinking that lead to 
different results. Coming up with complex plans such as the Trojan Horse requires 
refl ection and active use of knowledge, whereas such deliberation would seem anti-
thetical to Icarus’ fl ight. However, these two different modes of thought do seem to 
come together in a fashion, as is in Odysseus’ use of forward planning to defeat the 
consequences of his impulsive decision. In everyday life, as well, people often 
approach situations in these two ways—spending a while considering what to eat 
for lunch and making a deliberate selection but also automatically grabbing a sweet 
dessert without thinking about it at all. When considering how these mental 
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 processes work, it makes sense to look at the two styles of thinking separately to 
gain an understanding of their interaction and of their actual effect on behavior. 
 In this chapter we seek to illuminate the characteristics of these two processes, 
show their interactions with each another, and point out their common effect on 
behavior. To do so, it is fi rst necessary to evaluate each system independently, exam-
ining historical and current perspectives on refl ective and impulsive styles of 
thought. Thereafter, we present an integrative model of thinking and action in an 
endeavor to identify when which system of thought will be active and under what 
circumstances it will infl uence behavior. 
 A Short Overview of Refl ective and Impulsive Styles 
of Thinking 
 Theories of Refl ection 
 The idea that human behavior is based on active, refl ective thought guided by the 
principle of attaining benefi cial things is old and makes intuitive sense. It is diffi cult 
to argue why people would actively decide to act in a fashion that they know is bad 
for them without some belief that the action would ultimately be positive. In this 
conception of human thought, negative outcomes can be explained by a lack of 
information. The Greek philosopher Socrates, for example, proposed that people 
would otherwise act in ways that were good for them. 
 From a social psychological perspective, this kind of thinking is exemplifi ed in 
expectancy-value theories and the concept of  homo oeconomicus (e.g., Fishbein & 
Ajzen,  1975 ). The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen,  1985 ) is an established exam-
ple of an expectancy-value model (Conner & Armitage,  1998 ). It depicts behavior 
as a function of several specifi c mental factors. In this conceptualization the three 
determinants of behavior are the attitude toward the behavior, the subjective norm 
relevant to the behavior, and the perceived behavioral control over the behavior. An 
attitude toward a specifi c behavior is generated by multiplying the evaluation of a 
possible perceived outcome of the behavior (a value) by the perceived likelihood of 
that outcome (an expectancy) and then summing the results of this multiplication 
for all possible outcomes. Similarly, the subjective norm is calculated by multiply-
ing the actor’s motivation to comply with another person’s expectation by the per-
ceived likelihood that that person holds that expectation over all persons. By 
contrast, perceived behavioral control is a function of the perceived power of 
behavior- inhibiting or behavior-facilitating factors multiplied by the likelihood that 
the actor has access to these factors. 
 The assumption in the theory of planned behavior is, therefore, that a human 
actor’s calculation of these three determinants of behavior is optimally based on all 
available information. Once the determinants are established, the actor will  integrate 
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them for all possible behaviors and select the best option. This behavior is then initi-
ated via a behavioral intention. 
 This idea is echoed in various domains, both historically and in more modern 
contexts, such as organizational psychology (Vroom,  1964 ), addiction research 
(Sutton, Marsh, & Matheson,  1987 ), and education (Wigfi eld & Eccles,  2000 ). 
There is solid empirical support for the ability of expectancy-value models to pre-
dict intentions and behavior (e.g., Armitage & Conner,  2001 ). However, even the 
strongest empirical studies do not conclude that this kind of thinking can com-
pletely predict behavior. In particular, it seems unlikely that behavior occurring 
without conscious thought could be dependent on this kind of deliberative, inten-
tional processing (e.g., Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz,  1978 ). Therefore, one must 
consider alternative mental processes that are characterized by less deliberative 
processing. 
 Theories of Impulse 
 Expectancy-value models can describe the careful planning behind the Trojan horse 
well, but they seem less able to explain why Icarus would immolate his wings. The 
kind of action implied in the latter myth is apparently not infl uenced by the knowl-
edge of the action’s expected consequences. It may rather be seen as reckless, as 
based on an impulse that seems to instigate behavior automatically. This determi-
nant of behavior differs from the rational assumptions of Socrates or the theory of 
planned behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen,  1975 ) and must be explained by other means. 
Historically, this point is recognized by Aristotle in the  Nicomanchean Ethics 
(Crisp,  2000 ) when he argues that people may at times act against their judgment. 
In his view an overwhelming passion—physical feelings (e.g., hunger) and emo-
tions (e.g., fear or pleasure)—directly implies a practical conclusion to act on it. 
This practical conclusion may at times overpower the conclusions reached by 
reason. 
 Psychology as a discipline has focused mostly on factors that affect the ability of 
reasoned conclusions to control passionate ones (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack,  2009 ). 
For example, children’s ability to forgo a small, immediate reward in favor of a 
larger, delayed reward has been shown to depend on various factors, including 
opportunity to pay attention to the immediate reward and thinking happy or sad 
thoughts (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Raskoff,  1972 ). Muraven and Baumeister ( 2000 ) 
conceptualize the control of impulses as being achieved by a metaphorical “muscle” 
that is powered by limited resources and is subject to fatigue, a state called  ego 
depletion . In this view, reasoned control of impulses will fail if remaining resources 
of self-control are insuffi cient to overcome impulse strength. Personality variables 
have been linked to the ability to control impulses (e.g., Block & Block,  1980 ; 
Carver,  2005 ), as have physiological variables such as blood glucose and alcohol 
levels (Bushman & Cooper,  1990 ; Gailliot et al.,  2007 ) and situational factors such 
as the availability of tempting stimuli (Schachter,  1971 ). 
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 Another approach to impulses and their effect on behavior is provided by research 
on implicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes are seen as spontaneous, automatic affective 
and behavioral responses to attitude objects (Greenwald & Banaji,  1995 ). The view 
that impulsive behavior comes from overwhelming passion caused by a situation 
maps well onto this idea that attitude objects may spontaneously cause affect and 
behavior via automatic processes. This view contrasts with the position that atti-
tudes are evaluations of target objects (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken,  1993 ). The evaluative 
position implies a more deliberative assessment of object properties, which corre-
sponds to processes similar to those described in the theory of reasoned action 
(Fishbein & Ajzen,  1975 ). Researchers studying implicit attitudes generally adopt 
indirect attitude measures such as the affective priming paradigm (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes,  1986 ) or the implicit association test (IAT) 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,  1998 ). These instruments typically use a com-
bination of valent and categorical stimuli and measure their inhibition or facilitation 
of a target behavior. Affective priming studies show that people categorize evalua-
tive adjectives such as  good or  bad faster when they are congruent in valence to an 
attitude object shown immediately beforehand (Fazio,  2001 ). The IAT measures the 
difference between reaction times when participants are asked to categorize an 
object by attitudinal categories via a key-press reaction also associated with a par-
ticular valence (Greenwald et al.,  1998 ). These measures show that behavioral 
responses to specifi c stimuli are infl uenced by the valence of these stimuli. The dif-
ference between what these implicit measures capture and what traditional evalua-
tive measures (e.g., self-report questions) assess is apparent from their only moderate 
correlations (Fazio & Olson,  2003 ) and by the relative robustness of implicit mea-
sures with regard to participants’ conscious control (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes,  2001 ; 
Kim,  2003 ; but see Mierke & Klauer,  2001 , and Fiedler & Bluemke,  2005 , for criti-
cal discussions). One explains these results by stating that the spontaneous response 
to an attitudinal object is governed by associations that may differ in content from 
the results of a deliberative evaluation. These associations occur between perceived 
objects, behavior, and affect. The link between impulse and behavior has some theo-
retical basis—including the ideomotor principle (James,  1890 ) and the perception- 
behavior link (Bargh,  1997 )—as does a direct link between perception and affective 
response (Zajonc,  1980 ). However, research on implicit attitudes has not succeeded 
in explaining what an implicit attitude actually is, beyond the tautological func-
tional defi nition that an implicit attitude is what is measured by indirect measures 
(Strack & Deutsch,  2007 ). With evidence accruing that implicit attitudes may be 
strongly affected by the context (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park,  2001 ) and type (Bosson, 
Swann, & Pennebaker,  2000 ) of the measurement, the question of what exactly an 
impulse might be is becoming ever more relevant. 
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 Bridging the Gap: The Refl ective-Impulsive Model 
 The research and models presented so far shed some light on the mysteries of human 
behavior. The careful plan behind the Trojan Horse seems rooted in deliberative, 
expectancy-value thinking, whereas Icarus’ doomed fl ight into the sun might be 
seen as a lack of self-regulatory resources preventing him from automatically fl ying 
close to the bright sun. What has yet to be addressed is the question of the interac-
tion of these systems—how does Odysseus defeat the Siren’s call, or in more gen-
eral terms, how do deliberative, rational thought and impulsive affect and action 
interact? In the past three decades many researchers have attempted to address this 
question. In the realm of social psychology, the challenge has been met with many 
different dual-process models (see Chaiken & Trope,  1999 , for examples). These 
dual-process models stem from research on different topics, including persuasion 
(Chaiken,  1987 ; Petty & Cacioppo,  1986 ), stereotyping (Devine,  1989 ), causal attri-
bution (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull,  1988 ), and general cognition (Epstein, Lipson, 
Holstein, & Huh,  1992 ). Although these models deal with different aspects of 
human behavior and cognition, they share certain structural traits. In all cases, two 
modes of information processing are proposed, one of which is characterized by 
effortful, rule-based processing, the other by almost effortless, associative process-
ing. This distinction is delineated clearly by Sloman ( 1996 ), who describes both of 
these modes in detail. 
 Many infl uential dual-process models conform to this structure, but not all mod-
els provide for interactions between the proposed processes (for an overview, see 
Smith & DeCoster,  2000 ). Even fewer models make statements about how both 
processes infl uence behavior and whether they are interdependent in doing so. 
Rather, they specify how information is processed at a cognitive level—they 
describe how people think about what to eat for lunch and how they process the 
information that sweet desserts are available, but these models do not go beyond the 
formation of a behavioral decision on what would be best to eat. They also cannot 
describe how behavior can be instigated independently from a decision (e.g., Strack 
& Neumann,  1996 )—how it can be that one decides to eat a healthy lunch but still 
reach out for the sweet muffi n. In order to address these issues and fi ll the gap 
between knowledge and action, an integrative model that incorporates both ele-
ments is needed. For this purpose, Strack and Deutsch ( 2004 ) propose the refl ective- 
impulsive model (RIM), a dual-systems model conceived to clearly defi ne and 
integrate the theoretical perspectives so far presented under the headings of impul-
sive and refl ective. 
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 The Refl ective System 
 The RIM refers to the rational, rule-based system of thought as the refl ective sys-
tem. Slow and driven by resources of working memory, this system has limits on its 
capacity for information processing. It may be disengaged from processing under 
certain circumstances, but it is capable of generating knowledge via syllogistic 
inferences. It does so by activating concepts and possible relations between these 
concepts and then assigning a truth value to the proposition formed by the concepts 
and the relation. For example, the concepts  salad and  health may be activated, along 
with the relation of  is/is not . In this case the refl ective system would assign the value 
of  true to the confi guration, yielding the proposition  salad is healthy . If the concept 
of  muffi n was activated instead of  salad , the truth value might instead be  false , yield-
ing the proposition  muffi n is not healthy . 
 It is important to note that any other relation might be used beyond  is/is not , such 
as  implies/does not imply ,  causes/does not cause , or  is/is not a member of , to name 
a few. If several related propositions are constructed, new knowledge may be gener-
ated by the combination of these propositions. In keeping with the example proposi-
tions given above— salad is healthy and  muffi n is not healthy —an additional 
proposition of  being healthy is good might yield both the conclusion that salad is 
good and that muffi ns are not. Because the refl ective system is able to assign truth 
values to statements, rule-based inferences can be drawn in order to maximize the 
consistency of the resulting representation (Gawronski & Strack,  2004 ). The ability 
of this mode of processing to help a person generate and infer conclusions makes it 
extremely fl exible and useful for facilitating many operations typically associated 
with deliberative thought, including expectancy-value judgments and advanced 
social behavior (e.g., the discernment of people’s states of belief; see Wimmer & 
Perner,  1983 , for example) and the learning of new connections between concepts 
without much or any repetition. 
 The refl ective system is limited by boundary conditions that constrain its ability 
to process information. Two of the most important of these conditions are working 
memory capacity and arousal. The activation of concepts and relations and the 
transformation of the resulting propositions are assumed to take place in the work-
ing memory (Baddeley,  1986 ). These dynamics provide a functional limit to the 
complexity and scope of refl ective operations, in that the capacity of working mem-
ory may be insuffi cient to contain all the required propositions for a given operation 
concurrently. This statement is bolstered by studies showing that an impairment of 
working-memory capacity through a manipulation of cognitive load impairs logical 
reasoning (De Neys,  2006 ; DeWall, Baumeister, & Masicampo,  2008 ). Arousal, by 
contrast, affects refl ective processing in a nonlinear fashion resembling the Yerkes- 
Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson,  1908 )—intermediate levels of arousal facilitate the 
operation of the refl ective system. Evidence exists that high levels of arousal reduce 
complexity in social judgments (Baron,  2000 ; Lambert et al.,  2003 ; Paulhus & Lim, 
 1994 ), whereas low arousal, characteristic in a state of fatigue, for example, is also 
associated with lowered capacity to engage in refl ective processing. 
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 Important and ubiquitous cognitive phenomena rely upon the refl ective system’s 
ability to assign truth values to relations between concepts, an example of which is 
negation. The RIM predicts that negations of propositions can be processed only 
under circumstances in which the refl ective system can be engaged, that is, under 
conditions endowed with resources suffi cient for efforts to engage in processing. 
This statement differs from models based on the assumption that negations may be 
“tagged” onto propositions once and for all and henceforth no longer require refl ec-
tive engagement (e.g., Gilbert,  1991 ), and it is supported by evidence that negations 
require cognitive resources to process (Wason,  1959 ). 
 Refl ective processing is accompanied by a state of noetic awareness of whether 
something is the case or not. This awareness may sometimes be accompanied by a 
particular feeling that is processed consciously, a state of experiential awareness. It 
should be noted, however, that some operations in the refl ective system may require 
so few resources that they can be processed without corresponding noetic awareness 
or a feeling of intentionality (Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 
 2009 ). 
 The Impulsive System 
 Aside from the refl ective system, the RIM proposes the existence of an associative 
system of thought called the impulsive system. This system works continuously and 
effortlessly. Whereas the refl ective system uses working memory capacity, the 
impulsive system can be seen as long-term memory and therefore has functionally 
unlimited capacity. The impulsive system forms associative links between individ-
ual elements that may be of varying strengths. When an element is activated, other 
elements linked to it are activated in accordance with the strength of the links to the 
original element, a form of spreading activation. Recent or frequent activation of an 
element also increases both the accessibility of that element and the likelihood of its 
continued processing if further activation occurs. Links between elements are based 
on the principles of contiguity and similarity, so that stimuli that occur a short time 
or distance from one another are more likely to become linked or to have existing 
links strengthened than is the case with temporally or spatially nonproximal stimuli. 
It is important to note that refl ective processes activate corresponding patterns of 
impulsive elements, meaning that even elements that are never perceived together in 
the world may become associatively linked if they are often refl ectively processed 
together. The activation of impulsive elements may be accompanied by an experien-
tial state of awareness, with people experiencing a specifi c feeling without being 
able to say where it comes from. Such feelings are themselves elements in the 
impulsive system and may therefore be connected to other elements with varying 
link strengths. 
 This process of association is slow and enduring but also rigid. Although propo-
sitional processing in the refl ective system may create associative links between 
concepts in the impulsive system, it is not necessarily the case that propositional 
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processing can become completely automatic and effortless with enough practice 
(Deutsch et al.,  2009 ). Instead, specifi c patterns of thought may become easier but 
lose or change their meaning under circumstances where refl ective processing is 
hindered. As an example, African Americans who feel that whites perceive them 
negatively may often refl ectively think “Blacks are not bad” as a response; in the 
impulsive system, however, the concepts of  black and  bad are being activated at the 
same time and thereby linked (Livingston,  2002 ). This simultaneity may counterin-
tuitively lead African Americans to have additional negative feelings and associa-
tions with their in-group when they have no refl ective resources with which to 
negate the associative relation. However, the rigidity of associative processing is 
somewhat alleviated by the effects of motivational orientation. When people are in 
an approach orientation, they are prepared to reduce the distance between them-
selves and some aspect of their environments, whereas an avoidance orientation is 
preparedness to increase this distance. These fundamental orientations can facilitate 
associative activation when this activation is compatible (e.g., approach orientation 
may facilitate the activation of positively valent elements). Therefore, the sight of a 
muffi n might elicit the positive associations of  tasty ,  sweet , and  good more strongly 
when one is in an approach orientation, as when selecting what salad one would 
prefer for lunch, than when one is not. If one is currently in an avoidance orienta-
tion, having just read a brochure on calorie content and having selected the salad 
that would be least fattening, these associations might be weaker even before the 
activation of the refl ective system. However, it is clear that the associative system 
alone, although it requires no resources and works very quickly, is generally far less 
fl exible and adaptive than the refl ective system. 
 Interaction of Systems 
 Now that we have described the basic operating principles of the RIM’s two sys-
tems, it is necessary to show how they function together. The very structures of the 
two systems contain a fi rst important point relevant to their interaction: the impul-
sive system is always effortlessly active, whereas the refl ective system may also be 
inactive. The implication is that the refl ective system, when it does operate, does so 
in parallel with the impulsive system, not in place of it. That is, refl ective processing 
always occurs with parallel impulsive processing. It is also clear that the concepts 
that are transformed in working-memory space in the refl ective system do not come 
from nowhere but from the long-term store of the impulsive system. 
 As the systems cannot interact when the refl ective system is disengaged, it is 
adequate to examine how they interact from the beginning to the end of a refl ective 
operation. When a refl ective operation begins, perceptual input will already have 
activated several associative elements. For example, when thinking about what to 
have for lunch, a person may already have seen what is on offer in the cafeteria, a 
selection that will activate whatever associations that person has with the given meal 
options, but other perceptual data in the attentional focus (the presentation of the 
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food, the attractiveness of the serving staff, and any number of other concepts) will 
also activate associations of their own. Some of these associations will achieve suf-
fi cient activation to attain awareness, so a particularly delicious-looking muffi n 
might prompt an automatic expectation of a good taste. The refl ective system then 
categorizes and relates the activated concepts, the result being that the muffi n is 
recognized as tasting good, and activates additional relevant content in the impul-
sive system—such as health. This concept, in turn, changes the activation pattern in 
the impulsive system, so the associated concept of  salad might become activated as 
well. This activation pattern is again categorized, and the process repeats until a 
decision or inference is reached. Such end results in the refl ective system are driven 
by the principle of consistency of the propositions generated. For example  health is 
good ,  taste is good ,  health is more important than taste might lead to the decision 
to select the healthy salad rather than the unhealthy one but also the tasty muffi n, for 
this choice would be consistent with a greater number of propositions. However, the 
content of the propositions generated is necessarily limited by the activation pattern 
of the impulsive system—although tennis is also healthy, its activation potential in 
the environment of the cafeteria during lunch hour is very low, so the refl ective 
system will not include it in processing without any prior link or further relevant 
perceptual stimuli. 
 Synergy between the systems occurs when the impulsive system’s associations 
are valid and relevant to a consistent refl ective solution. When the impulsive activa-
tion pattern is in synergy with refl ective processing, concepts relevant to the focus 
of refl ective processing become comparatively accessible, and cognitive effort is 
therefore reduced. The refl ective system is not forced to perform extra categoriza-
tions and activations of concepts to achieve consistency, so subjective effort is less-
ened. This reduction may be accompanied by a feeling of fl ow (Winkielman, Huber, 
Kavanagh, & Schwarz,  2012 ), that is, ease of processing, which is then linked to 
positive affect. Therefore, when both systems are in accord, it feels easy and good 
to think and make decisions. As an example, if the only tasty option in the cafeteria 
were the healthy salad, people who ate there and cared deeply about their health 
(i.e., had a high accessibility of the concept health) would fi nd it natural to choose 
the salad and, moreover, would feel good about how easy the choice was. A differ-
ent picture emerges when the systems are at odds with each other, as when impul-
sive activation patterns present associations that are opposed to a consistent refl ective 
conclusion and produce a feeling of confl ict. It requires additional cognitive effort 
to activate new impulsive patterns and to form propositions that lead to a consistent 
end state. Once the muffi n is added to the lunch options, the decision-maker must 
actively work against the temptation of the tasty dessert in order to generate the 
propositions about healthy eating that justify selecting the salad. This dependence 
of effortful processing on automatic activation has an interesting consequence: A 
fl uently (synergistically) processed inference should have a higher truth value than 
a disfl uently (antagonistically) processed inference does, unless the refl ective sys-
tem specifi cally corrects for the consequences of fl uency (Allport & Lepkin,  1945 ; 
Begg, Anas, & Farinacci,  1992 ; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon,  2007 ). The 
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 fl uency of processing should affect both how sure a person is of a syllogistic infer-
ence and how securely she or he stands behind a given decision. 
 Common Pathway to Behavior 
 Having described how the refl ective and impulsive systems are structured and how 
they interact during the process of thought, we now turn to two issues that many 
other dual-process models have not yet addressed: how these mental processes are 
linked to behavior and especially how they interact when causing behavior. The 
RIM seeks to provide an answer to this central question through the component of 
behavioral schemata . In a general sense, behavioral schemata are clusters of ele-
ments in the impulsive system. They consist of specifi c motor representations of 
behavior, the perceptual input of typical context factors for the behavior, and the 
consequences of those factors. As elements of the impulsive system, specifi c behav-
ioral schemata (e.g., how to grip a fork) will likely be associated with other behav-
ioral schemata that are relevant to the context, the specifi c motor activation, or the 
consequences of the behavior. This result leads to the conclusion that several spe-
cifi c, concrete behavioral schemata might form clusters that, in turn, can be seen as 
behavioral schemata of greater abstractness. Gripping a fork and gripping a spoon, 
for instance, are similar in terms of expected consequences (tasting food) and con-
text (involving food, eating utensils, etc.). The more abstract behavioral schema in 
this case might be termed  holding cutlery , which might, in turn, connect to other 
schemata to form a cluster of  eating politely , and so on. This conceptual hierarchy 
bears some relationship to other conceptualizations of schemata but is more specifi c 
than its typical use (for a discussion see Fiske & Linville,  1980 ; Lodge, McGraw, 
Conover, Feldman, & Miller,  1991 ). 
 If behavioral schemata are situated in the impulsive system, they are also subject 
to spreading activation. In a way similar to that of nonbehavioral elements in the 
impulsive system, behavioral schemata can be activated automatically if enough 
other elements with suffi ciently strong links to the schema are activated. In the case 
of behavioral schemata, activation includes performance of the motor program 
embedded within the schema. The refl ective system, on the other hand, activates 
behavioral schemata by propositionally connecting the self to the required behav-
ioral schema by means of a behavioral decision. If the decision refers to a behavior 
that is to take place in future, the refl ective system additionally links the behavior’s 
expected relevant context with the cluster, creating an intention (Gollwitzer,  1999 ). 
Although the systems encompass different precursors to behavior, they use the same 
fi nal gateway to enact behavior, namely, the activation of behavioral schemata, ele-
ments of the impulsive system. The implication is that the same principles of system 
interaction that apply to purely mental operations in the RIM also apply to behav-
ioral processes—fl uent, synergistic processing of behavioral decisions leads to 
behavior that is performed more smoothly and easily than disfl uent, antagonistic 
processing. In extreme cases of the latter, the impulsive activation of behavioral 
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schemata might be so strong that a refl ective behavioral decision will not lead 
directly to behavior, as when one knows that eating the dessert is wrong and has 
decided not to, but the eyes and hands still seem to have their own volition to fi xate 
on the forbidden. In this case the operating conditions of the systems will decide 
which behavior is performed. In states inimical to refl ective processing, such as 
high arousal or reduced working memory capacity, the impulse to act will likely win 
out, whereas an unhindered refl ective system might redirect the activation pattern in 
the impulsive system by, for example, diverting attention or actively linking nega-
tive consequences or attributes to the impulsive behavior. In this sense, there is little 
difference between mentally grappling with an unwanted impulsive idea, such as 
unwanted racist thoughts, and with an unwanted physical impulse, such as reaching 
for that tempting muffi n. 
 Knowledge and Action: Bidirectional Connections 
 Having established that behavioral schemata are situated in the impulsive system, 
we note that an important additional implication of the RIM becomes clear. In the 
impulsive system, each element adheres to the mechanism of spreading activation, 
including behavioral schemata. Because behavioral schemata are linked to conse-
quences and contextual stimuli, activating the behavior also activates related con-
cepts. Therefore, behavior can directly infl uence cognition, both by creating and 
modifying associative links and by infl uencing what concepts are likely to become 
active in the refl ective system. For example, the act of reaching for the muffi n, if 
repeated often, may eventually become suffi ciently associated with the sight of the 
muffi n that the action is triggered by the sight. Similarly, this association makes the 
muffi n more likely to come to mind when one is reaching for the salad, that is, when 
performing the very motor program associated with the muffi n. This bidirectional-
ity of infl uence—behavior to cognition as well as cognition to behavior—also holds 
for motivational orientation in that behaviors associated with approach will activate 
an approach orientation, whereas avoidance behavior has the opposite effect. 
 This link between behavior and cognition is not a new idea in principle. A similar 
effect is assumed in several infl uential theories, such as cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger,  1957 ) and self-perception theory (Bem,  1967 ). They also predict a 
change in attitudes as a specifi c form of cognition that is based on behavior, albeit 
via different mechanisms. The important difference lies in precisely these mecha-
nisms. According to cognitive dissonance theory, a behavior that runs counter to an 
existing belief about the self causes an aversive motivational state that may be alle-
viated by changing existing beliefs or adding new ones, whereas the assumption in 
self-perception theory is that people infer their attitudes toward particular objects 
from their own behavior toward those objects. Both of these proposed mechanisms 
require propositional processing because they depend on a categorization of the 
behavior in question. The RIM, on the other hand, describes a direct link between 
behavior and cognition via the associative links between behavioral schemata and 
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contiguously activated concepts in the impulsive system. It is not that cognitive dis-
sonance and self-perception theory lack validity but rather that their path from 
behavior to cognitive change is not the only possible one. 
 When this perspective on the connection between behavior and implicit associa-
tive links is applied to the fi eld of implicit attitudes, several interesting implications 
arise. From the perspective of the RIM, implicit attitudes measured by the IAT, 
affective priming, and other procedures based on reaction time refl ect the strength 
of associative links between a target and a valence by means of a behavior associ-
ated with that valence. 1 In view of the attributes of the impulsive system, it follows 
that negated targets or valences should, under certain circumstances, have the same 
effect on reaction times as nonnegated ones do. Evidence supporting this logic 
comes from the Bona Fide Pipeline task (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 
 1995 ), which was used in a study by Deutsch, Gawronski, and Strack ( 2006 ), who 
showed that positive prime words facilitated categorization of positive targets even 
when the prime was negated, whereas both negated and nonnegated negative prime 
words facilitated categorization of negative target. Although this effect is not uni-
versal (Deutsch et al.,  2009 ), it provides evidence that impulsive associations are 
what implicit attitude procedures measure. Procedures used to change implicit atti-
tudes, such as automatic stereotype reduction training (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, 
Hermsen, & Russin,  2000 ), can also benefi t from the implications of the RIM’s 
structure. In the original automatic stereotype reduction training, participants were 
induced to respond to stereotype-congruent pairings with a NO key and to stereotype- 
incongruent pairings with a YES key. Although this method was effective in reduc-
ing automatic stereotype activation, a study using only stereotype-incongruent 
pairings has shown the procedure to work (Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & 
Strack,  2008 ). The same studies also showed that negation of stereotype-congruent 
pairings alone actually increased implicit stereotyping, a prediction derived from 
the contrast between the propositional nature of negation and the associative nature 
of contiguous stimuli pairs. 
 The bidirectional link between behavior and cognition in the RIM also makes that 
model a valuable framework for studies that deal with embodied effects on cognition. 
The basic idea of embodiment research is that cognition is always founded in mecha-
nisms of sensory processing and motor control (e.g., Wilson,  2002 ). The role of percep-
tual information and motor-processing in the impulsive system and the infl uence 
thereby exerted on the refl ective system mirror this basic assumption. Precursor 
research to the current wave of embodiment movement, such as the pen study by 
Strack, Martin, and Stepper ( 1988 ) and the headphone study by Förster and Strack 
( 1996 ), have already been discussed from the perspective of the RIM (Strack & 
Deutsch,  2004 ), but newer investigations into embodied processes might also be inte-
grated into this model. For example, Zhong and Lijenquist ( 2006 ) show that washing 
hands reduced the effects of guilt on compensatory prosocial behavior. The authors 
explain the effect in terms of symbolic self-completion (Wicklund & Gollwitzer,  1981 ), 
1  The IAT is also capable of measuring associations other than valence, but because the argument 
is analogous to valence associations, it is omitted here. 
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but an alternative explanation offered by the RIM would be that the metaphorical asso-
ciation of purity with cleanliness might confl ict with a negative activation of the self in 
the context of guilt and thereby alleviate the guilt’s effects on behavior. Thus, an impe-
tus is given for further inquiries into the precise mechanism behind embodiment effects. 
 Determinants of Systematic Behavioral Control 
 Having established the parameters and attributes of the two systems of the RIM and 
their parallel effects on behavior, we turn to explaining possible determinants of 
either system’s dominance over the other in having these effects. If it is possible to 
identify variables that can affect which system determines behavior, one can vastly 
improve the predictive power of the RIM for behavior. Because the impulsive sys-
tem is always active and processing, this question can be rephrased: Under what 
circumstances will the refl ective system assert behavioral control when in confl ict 
with the impulsive system? 
 Motivation and Opportunity 
 Fazio ( 1990 ) describes two modes of thinking—a spontaneous processing mode 
based on attitude accessibility, and a deliberative processing mode based on attitude 
behavior. These modes of thinking are remarkably similar in structure to the RIM’s 
proposed systems, certain differences in mechanisms notwithstanding. Therefore, 
the MODE model (Fazio,  1990 ), which predicts when the deliberative mode will be 
engaged in processing the possible consequences of behavior, may be applicable to 
the RIM as well. In this conceptualization, engagement in deliberative processing 
depends on motivation and opportunity. Motivation in the MODE model is generated 
by the fear of invalidity (Kruglanski & Freund,  1983 ), a function of the perceived 
costliness of a judgmental mistake to the self, whereas opportunity is a function of 
the available time and resources for processing. Applying this framework to the RIM, 
one fi nds that the defi ned properties of the refl ective system are in accord with these 
predictions. Refl ective processing is accompanied by a feeling of subjective effort 
and so requires motivation, whereas both the reliance on the resources of working 
memory and the relatively slow speed of the refl ective system make it clear that the 
refl ective system can infl uence behavior only if the opportunity is given. 
 Evidence for this dependence on opportunity exists in many domains. Cognitive 
load, a manipulation often used to impair deliberative processing, has been applied 
in various different studies whose results can be explained with the RIM. Self- 
control (e.g., Lattimore & Maxwell,  2004 ; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos,  1993 ), pro-
cessing of negated stimuli (Deutsch et al.  2009 ), social judgments and attributions 
(Gilbert et al.,  1988 ; Krull & Erickson,  1995 ; Trope & Alfi eri,  1997 ), moral 
 judgments (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen,  2008 ), and general 
reasoning (De Neys,  2006 ) have all proven to be impaired by cognitive load in ways 
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that are consistent with the RIM’s predictions. The idea that working memory 
resources may also play a role in refl ective processing has been tested in several 
studies, both by comparing individuals with dispositionally high or low working 
memory capacities (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt,  2008 ; 
Thush et al.,  2008 ) and by specifi cally taxing resources of working memory 
(Deutsch et al.,  2009 ). The conceptualization of working memory as “a domain-free 
limitation in ability to control attention” (Engle,  2002 , p. 19) points to the conclu-
sion that the effects of attentional cognitive load manipulations on refl ective pro-
cessing may be mediated by working memory capacity. 
 Self-Regulatory Resources 
 Vohs ( 2006 ) argues that the RIM’s refl ective system is, in fact, powered by self- 
regulatory resources (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice,  1998 ). This 
account is based on the similarity between the idea of such resources and the cogni-
tive resources discussed in relation to the RIM. Vohs & Faber, ( 2007 ) argue that 
impulsive spending, a phenomenon expected to occur under circumstances that 
inhibit refl ective processing, does indeed occur more often when participants are 
depleted of self-regulatory resources. A structurally similar argument is made with 
respect to overeating among dieters (Vohs & Heatherton  2000 ). Further evidence for 
this integration of theories comes from research showing that effortful self- 
regulation has a detrimental effect on subsequent reasoning capabilities (Schmeichel, 
Vohs, & Baumeister,  2003 ). The bidirectionality of this effect, that is, a negative 
effect that prior refl ective decision-making exerts on subsequent self-regulation, is 
shown in a laboratory paradigm encompassing many simple decisions followed by 
a self-regulatory exercise. The effect’s bidirectionality also surfaces in a fi eld study 
in which shoppers who reported having made effortful decisions previously solved 
fewer math problems than those who had engaged in fewer decisions during their 
shopping trip (Vohs et al.,  2008 ). Although this evidence hints at a connection 
between self-regulatory and refl ective cognitive resources, these studies do not 
show a direct link between the two. Other research shows that dietary standards and 
explicit target attitudes predict behavior only when self-regulatory resources are 
available; when it is not, implicit attitudes are better predictors (Friese, Hofmann, & 
Wänke,  2008 ; Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski,  2007 ). The fact that impulsive and 
refl ective predictors diverge depending on the availability of self-regulatory 
resources underlines the conceptualization of self-regulation as a confl ict between 
impulsive and refl ective behavioral activation. Together with the evidence presented 
by Vohs ( 2006 ), these fi ndings permit the conclusion that research on resource- 
based self-regulation can be integrated into the RIM. It remains to be seen whether 
self-regulatory resources are equivalent to working memory resources or whether 
they constitute their own construct. 
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 Implications of the RIM 
 Thinking Is Tough! 
 Coming up with a complex plan of action is not a simple endeavor. The Trojan 
Horse required the cunning Odysseus to think hard for a long time, and this story is 
one of the main reasons he endures as a hero fi gure. In general terms, it is not easy 
to engage in refl ective processing—beyond the subjective feeling of diffi culty, there 
may be physical limits to the human ability to think (Gailliot et al.,  2007 ). Although 
thinking may sometimes be facilitated when the refl ective and impulsive systems 
are in accord, people must often use refl ective processing against the pull of impul-
sive associations. Whether this struggle is due to temptation or to particularly com-
plex challenges in the environment, the diffi culty in staying the refl ective course is 
clear. 
 However, cultivating moral or thoughtful habits may become easier with time. 
Specifi c propositional operations can become associated with the feeling of tempta-
tion if they are activated often enough, and even the experiential component of 
refl ective operation (the feeling of effortful cognition) is itself represented in the 
impulsive system and may thus become associated with it. For careful planning 
habits, positive affect associated with successful plans may lead to the process of 
planning itself acquiring a positive valence, with these habits of thought perhaps 
eventually becoming inculcated through successful implementation. However, this 
effect is not suffi cient to become truly automatic. Although refl ective processing 
may become facilitated by such mechanisms, propositional reasoning itself cannot 
become automated. If resources are lacking, not even these habits of refl ection will 
make for better control of impulses or careful planning. No matter how accessible 
the relevant propositional transformations may be in the impulsive system, refl ec-
tive resources are required if a person is actually to bring those transformations to 
bear upon activated concepts. 
 The habit of critical metacognition is a particularly interesting case. Metacognition 
refers to thoughts about one’s own thoughts, and critical metacognition is therefore 
those thoughts that evaluate the thinking process. In cognitive-behavioral therapy, 
thoughts are actively evaluated by the patient and classifi ed as rational or irrational 
(Baer,  2003 ). The goal of such interventions is often to change dysfunctional behav-
ior or thinking patterns, such as “catastrophizing” (Beck,  1976 ). Pursuing this kind 
of metacognitive thought alteration or suppression may be especially diffi cult 
because of the vast refl ective resources required. A strong association between the 
metacognitive monitoring process and the undesired thoughts would eventually 
activate the latter rather than suppress them, requiring additional refl ective resources 
to eliminate them. Evidence from studies on emotional disorders shows that meta-
cognitive thought suppression does indeed increase the frequency of unwanted 
thoughts (Purdon,  1999 ). Although long-term use of metacognitive strategies may 
eventually divest undesired thoughts of their potency, it seems clear that the way 
there is a long and cognitively taxing one. 
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 Sometimes No Means Yes If I Can’t Process It 
 Given the research showing that negation is a refl ective process that requires refl ec-
tive resources (Deutsch et al.,  2006 ,  2009 ; Grant, Malaviya, & Sternthal,  2004 ), one 
must wonder at the effi cacy of negated persuasive messages. Evidence showing that 
older adults may be more likely to misremember explicitly negated information has 
been interpreted as a warning against negatively worded statements in healthcare 
materials (Wilson & Park,  2008 ). Wakefi eld et al.’s ( 2008 ) fi nding that antismoking 
campaigns funded by tobacco companies have few, if any, negative effects on teen-
agers’ intentions to smoke may be partially due to the negated messages employed 
(e.g., “Think, Don’t Smoke”; see Farrelly, Niederdeppe, & Yarsevich,  2003 ). These 
effects can be explained by a lack of processing resources in recalling the content of 
the messages. If advertisements or healthcare instructions convey associations that 
are negated in the message, then recall of the message may be confi ned to the asso-
ciation between the elements under circumstances of low refl ective resources. This 
limitation can lead negated statements to be remembered as affi rmed. Positively 
formulated messages (i.e., those whose association mirrors their propositional con-
nection) are more effective, as with antismoking ads that depict smoking in combi-
nation with serious consequences for health (Biener,  2002 ). 
 This logic might also be generalized to ethical norms in everyday life. If pre-
sented as negated statements (such as  don’t drink and drive ), strong ethical norms 
may have a behavioral effect opposite to what is expected. If people are continually 
reminded of what they should not do, the unwanted action will be continually acti-
vated in the impulsive system and thereby affect subsequent refl ective and impul-
sive operations. If a sermon on the forbidden practice of adultery activates that 
concept and its infl uence on evaluations, the listener could see some other members 
of the congregation as attractive for possibly committing adultery with them. Of 
course, this possibility would be negated, but only if the listener had suffi cient 
refl ective resources available to perform the negation. It would be particularly prob-
lematic in cases where the forbidden behavior is hedonically attractive to start with; 
the activation of the concept would then also activate the expectation of the pleasant 
feeling associated with it and elicit an approach orientation. A better approach to 
ethics according to this logic might instead be to praise exemplars of morality or to 
prescribe morally positive acts as opposed to forbidding negative ones. Instead of 
saying no to vice, one should say yes to virtue. 
 Improving Implicit Self-Esteem 
 Implicit self-esteem is a much researched construct of recent years (e.g., Koole, 
Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg,  2001 ; Yamaguchi et al.,  2007 ). In a general sense, 
implicit self-esteem is defi ned as an automatic evaluation of the self that occurs 
nonconsciously and affects spontaneous reactions to self-relevant stimuli (Bosson, 
et al.  2000 ). Implicit self-esteem has been shown to specifi cally predict diverse 
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outcomes in a range of situations, including apparent anxiety in participants as they 
complete a self-relevant interview (Spalding & Hardin,  1999 ), levels of implicit 
gender bias in combination with implicit gender identity (Aidman & Carroll,  2003 ), 
and depressive symptomatology 6 months after measurement (Franck, De Readt, & 
De Houwer,  2007 ). Explicit self-esteem (i.e., explicit evaluations of self-worth), on 
the other hand, has specifi c predictive power for subjective well-being (Schimmack 
& Diener,  2003 ). It is the combination of the two constructs, however, that has 
excited most interest in recent years. In particular, the question of discrepant self- 
esteem has been examined (Zeigler-Hill,  2006 ). That is, what effects do high explicit 
but low implicit, or low explicit but high implicit, self-esteem have on behavior? 
One direct prediction based on psychodynamic theory concerns narcissism. The 
 mask model of narcissism assumes that narcissistic individuals are characterized by 
deep self-doubt (corresponding to low implicit self-esteem), which they compen-
sate for by projecting grandiose self-views (corresponding to extremely high explicit 
self-esteem) (Bosson et al.,  2008 ). Empirical evidence supporting this model has 
remained mixed, however, perhaps partly because of the relative unreliability of 
measures of implicit self-esteem (Bosson et al.,  2000 ). 
 By rather precisely spelling out the concepts involved, the RIM can contribute to 
the discussion of these and other phenomena of the implicit self. Implicit self- 
esteem might, for instance, be conceptualized as the total valence of the associative 
pattern linked with activation of the self in the impulsive system. This specifi cation 
would imply recommendations for effective measures of implicit self-esteem—
namely, measures that do not require any explicit judgment but rather depend solely 
on valence and behavior interference (e.g., the IAT, measures based on the logic of 
affective priming). In addition, the same logic that is applied to automatic stereotype 
reduction training (Gawronski et al.,  2008 ) may be applied to the implicit self- 
esteem construct. Doing so yields a method through which to increase implicit self- 
esteem by consistently affi rming positive pairings of valence and self (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis,  2004 ), suggesting a possible avenue for therapy of narcissism and 
other negative effects of low implicit self-esteem. 
 Conclusion 
 The RIM offers a multitude of predictions that can help improve the understanding 
of the link between knowledge and action, whether it be explaining the reasoning 
processes behind complex plans such as the Trojan Horse, the seemingly self- 
destructive fl ight of Icarus, or even the confl ict between rationality and impulse as 
epitomized in Odysseus’ suffering of the Siren’s song. Although effortful, refl ec-
tive processing may occur in fl uent synergy with impulsive processing, there are 
often confl icts between the two systems. Their resolution is a question of available 
refl ective resources and motivation to use them. But whether the systems work in 
concert or struggle against one another, the pathway to behavior is ultimately the 
same—behavioral schemata are activated depending on the results of both 
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systems’ processing. However, it is not just knowledge that may determine action 
in the context of the RIM. The bidirectional associative links between behavioral 
schemata and other elements of the impulsive system mean that action, in turn, 
infl uences knowledge. This bidirectionality in combination with the functioning of 
the two systems can tell much about what it means to think and act, when No might 
appear to mean Yes, and how to pinpoint and modify the elusive implicit self. 
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